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In 1997, the Government of Mexico introduced a 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) program called 
Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación 
(Progresa), providing assistance to about 300,000 
extremely poor households. The essential premise of 
a CCT program is a cash transfer to households, 
conditioned on their participation in health, nutrition, 
and education services. Ten years later, Progresa, 
now Oportunidades, covers more than 5 million 
households in all 31 Mexican states. Approximately 
20 countries have adopted a pilot or full-scale CCT 
program, and another 20 countries have expressed 
interest in starting one. Most current programs are in 
Latin America, but others can be found in Asia, 
Africa, and the Caribbean, and interest is increasing 
among African countries struggling with extreme 
poverty and low human capital. CCT programs are 
increasingly perceived as being “a magic bullet in 
development.” Are they? This brief presents a review 
of the rationale and operation of CCT programs, an 
assessment of their effectiveness, and a discussion 
of key issues facing countries considering these 
interventions or reforming existing programs. 
How Do CCT Programs Work? 
CCT programs have the following characteristics: 
They are targeted to poor households, and the cash 
transfers are usually paid to mothers. Some 
programs also include transfers such as nutritional 
supplements or school supplies for children. Cash 
transfers may be made as a lump sum or determined 
based on the number of children, with the amount 
varying by the children’s age and sex. In some 
countries, higher transfers are paid for girls’ school 
attendance and for secondary school attendance. In 
return for these transfers, recipients commit to 
undertaking certain actions, such as enrolling 
children in school and maintaining adequate 
attendance levels; attending pre- and postnatal 
health care appointments; and seeing that preschool 
children receive vaccinations, growth monitoring, and 
regular checkups. Some programs require women to 
attend regular health and nutrition training 
workshops. Some provide resources that improve the 
supply and quality of the schools and health care 
facilities used by beneficiaries. 
As such, CCT programs aim to reduce current 
poverty, while also seeking to improve human capital 
formation and, in doing so, help prevent the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty. 
Impacts of CCT Programs  
Rigorous evaluations—often built into the programs 
themselves—show that many, but not all, CCT 
programs have been successful in improving human 
capital outcomes. In Mexico, Progresa increased 
enrollment in secondary school by 6 percentage 
points for boys and 9 percentage points for girls. For 
girls—who often drop out before secondary school—
those making the transition to secondary school 
increased by 15 percentage points. Children in the 
program also entered school at an earlier age and 
repeated fewer grades. Progresa had relatively little 
impact, however, on school attendance rates, on 
achievement on standardized tests, or in bringing 
dropouts back to school. These objectives must thus 
be pursued through design improvements or 
complementary programs. CCT programs in 
Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey all improved 
secondary school enrollment but had little impact on 
primary school enrollment rates because these were 
already high. Where pre-program enrollment rates 
are extremely low, the effects of CCT programs can 
be very high: in Cambodia, for example, secondary 
school enrollment increased by 30 percentage points 
and attendance by 43 points.  
In Bangladesh, where 3 million children are still 
not enrolled in primary school, a small CCT program 
targeting the hardest-to-reach children (including 
street children) increased primary school enrollment 
by 9 percentage points, though this occurred only in 
schools where grants were also provided to improve 
school quality. In Nicaragua, where primary school 
enrollment was also low, the CCT program increased 
overall enrollment by 13 percentage points, 
enrollment of children from the very poorest 
households by 25 points, and regular primary school 
attendance by 20 points. Two years after households 
stopped receiving benefits, however, enrollment 
dropped by 12.5 percentage points, but this was still 
8 points higher than before the program, implying 
some sustainability of impact. This experience points 
to the important, but little understood, question of 
how to maintain the effects of CCT programs after 
households graduate from a program or after it ends.  
CCT programs have also had significant impacts 
on health and nutrition. In Mexico, health visits 
increased by 18 percent in Progresa localities, and 
illnesses among Progresa children 0–5 years old 
were reduced by 12 percent. Young children in 
Honduras increased use of health services by 15–21 
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percentage points, though there, as in Brazil, no 
effects on children’s illness rates were found. Some 
of the largest increases were found in the regular 
monitoring of children’s growth in CCT programs in 
rural Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua.  
A number of CCT programs are also associated 
with increased child height, which is an important 
measure of long-term nutritional status. Stunting was 
reduced in Mexico by 10 percentage points, in 
Nicaragua by 5.5 points, and in Colombia by 7 
points. Although the exact mechanism that triggers 
improvement is not known for certain, it may result 
from one or several program characteristics, such as 
higher incomes that permit increased expenditure on 
food, growth monitoring and information about 
nutrition and child care, or nutritional supplements. 
In both Mexico and Nicaragua, for example, calorie 
intake increased, as did the consumption of fruits, 
vegetables, meat, and dairy products. In Honduras, 
no positive nutritional impacts were found because of 
implementation problems, while in Brazil, the 
program was initially associated with a slightly 
reduced weight gain, but this phenomenon was 
subsequently reversed. According to anecdotal 
evidence, mothers may have kept children 
underweight under the mistaken belief that they 
would lose their benefits if children gained too much. 
This points to the importance of well-functioning 
mechanisms to ensure clear and regular 
communication between the program and 
beneficiaries so that conditionalities do not create 
perverse incentives. In Turkey, insufficient or 
incorrect information about the program also 
reduced impacts. 
Some programs also address micronutrient 
deficiencies. In Mexico, program beneficiaries had 
anemia rates substantially lower than 
nonparticipants, though rates remained high. In 
Nicaragua, although mothers reported receiving the 
iron supplement, anemia rates were not affected, in 
part because they did not give the supplement to 
children, believing it was bad for their stomach and 
teeth. Both cases point to the continuing challenge of 
addressing nutritional deficiencies, where 
multidimensional approaches, rather than cash 
transfers or supplements alone, are needed.  
CCT programs have a sharp gender focus. They 
have been successful in significantly increasing 
school enrollment rates for girls, who have 
historically faced discrimination because educating 
them is not considered as important as educating 
boys. Research in Mexico and Nicaragua has found 
that CCT programs are associated with improved 
attitudes toward educating girls, as well as a 
heightened profile for women more generally. 
Although there has been concern and some evidence 
that women’s program responsibilities can lead to 
conflicts with men, in both countries there is more 
evidence that the program’s infusion of financial 
resources has reduced intrahousehold tensions. 
Where CCT programs organize collective activities for 
beneficiaries, such as meetings, committees, and 
workshops, women report increases in their 
knowledge, social awareness, and self-confidence. 
Nevertheless, not all CCT programs provide these 
opportunities, and therefore they overlook potential 
for increasing women’s status. Research in eastern 
Turkey found that sociocultural biases against 
schooling for girls were more powerful than cash 
incentives, indicating the need for complementary 
approaches to overcome these constraints. Even in 
this region, however, the program provides 
opportunities for women to spend time out of their 
homes and to engage with institutions such as banks 
and government offices. 
CCT programs tend to be administratively 
centralized because their complexity requires 
standardization; hence, they offer fewer avenues for 
community participation than many other 
development interventions. Nevertheless, the 
programs still affect communities—positively or 
negatively—depending on their design and 
implementation. Programs in Brazil, Colombia, 
Honduras, and Mexico have all found ways to 
integrate varying types of local input into their 
programs: from a beneficiary feedback system in 
Mexico, to local input into targeting in Brazil, to 
school-based parents’ organizations and quality 
improvement teams for the health services in 
Honduras, to mothers’ assemblies in Colombia. While 
data-based centralized targeting has generally been 
successful in reaching the poor and avoiding political 
manipulation at the local level, it has also frequently 
bred discontent in communities when people do not 
understand the targeting criteria, perceive it as 
unfair, or do not have access to a functioning 
appeals mechanism. Exploring country-specific 
options for participation could lead to programs that 
are even more effective in achieving their primary 
goals, while increasing collective and individual 
empowerment. 
Development and Implementation Issues 
Are CCT Programs Too Expensive? 
The concern that governments in poor countries 
can’t afford CCT programs should be considered 
within the context of the large sums spent by many 
governments on programs directed to the nonpoor. 
Energy subsidies, for example, are typically highly 
regressive and often more costly than CCT programs: 
Egypt spent 8 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) on energy subsidies in 2004, and Indonesia 
spent 5 percent in 2005. Bailouts of insolvent 
contributory pension funds are another example. The 
expansion of Brazil’s well-targeted CCT program, 
Bolsa Familia, to cover the bottom quintile of the 
population would cost about 0.4 percent of GDP, 
while the Brazilian government now spends nearly 10 
times that amount covering the deficit in the main 
federal pension programs, which deliver more than 
50 percent of their benefits to the richest quintile. 
These are not isolated examples: many other 
countries spend considerable amounts of money on 
industry subsidies and military expenditures. In some 
very poor countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, donors and nongovernmental organizations 3 
(NGOs) have stepped in as partners with 
governments considering or implementing CCT 
programs, viewing them as potentially cost-effective 
approaches to increasing human capital—for 
example, by protecting children in households 
affected by AIDS. 
Even if a country can afford a CCT program, it is 
sometimes argued that, relative to other types of 
social safety nets, they are expensive to operate. For 
example, in its first year of operation, Progresa spent 
$1.34 on administrative costs for every dollar spent 
on transfers to beneficiaries. Statistics like these 
shape a common perception that CCT programs are 
too expensive. Closer scrutiny, however, shows a 
different picture. First, as with any program, fixed 
establishment costs, such as buying computers, 
identifying beneficiaries, and so on, are 
comparatively high. But by Progresa’s third full year 
of operation, administrative costs had fallen to only 5 
cents for every dollar spent on transfers. Second, 
many administrative costs—such as identifying 
beneficiaries, establishing mechanisms for delivering 
the benefit, and monitoring and evaluating the 
program—are common to all social protection 
programs. Further, some of these costs are incurred 
to improve the program’s effectiveness. Reducing 
expenditures on targeting, for example, might reduce 
administrative costs, but if targeting performance is 
severely weakened as a result, the cost savings are 
counterproductive. An important cost issue is 
whether conditionality significantly increases 
program costs. Existing evidence is mixed, largely 
because the intensity of monitoring conditionalities is 
a choice made by program designers and 
implementers. In the case of the CCT program in 
Honduras, monitoring accounted for about 9 percent 
of administrative costs.  
Is Conditionality Necessary? 
An important question being debated as new 
countries consider cash transfer programs is whether 
to impose conditionalities. Are conditional cash 
transfers in fact better than unconditional ones when 
it comes to achieving objectives, and, if so, for what 
objectives and under what conditions? Three broad 
arguments support conditionality: the first relates to 
the externalities associated with certain types of 
human capital investments. For example, when 
making decisions about their children’s care—say 
decisions about girls’ schooling—parents may not 
take into account the benefits that society derives 
from educating girls, and, as a result, they 
underinvest in girls’ schooling relative to optimal 
levels from a societal perspective. Conditionality can 
be an effective means of increasing these 
investments. Second, sociocultural biases against 
schooling may be imposed by more powerful groups 
(for example, men) on the less powerful (for 
example, their daughters), and conditionality 
provides state legitimation of social change. Third, 
conditionality may overcome the possible stigma as-
sociated with welfare payments if conditions are seen 
as part of a social contract between beneficiaries and 
the state. Finally, conditionality may be required for 
reasons of political economy. Politicians and policy-
makers are often evaluated by performance indica-
tors, such as changes in school enrollment or use of 
health clinics, and the impacts of CCT programs pro-
vide a basis for sustaining public support. Condition-
ality has also increased the credibility of programs 
where, historically, the public has often been suspi-
cious of antipoverty efforts that were deemed inef-
fectual.  
Conditionality also raises several concerns: first, 
there must be reasonable access to schools and 
clinics. Second, governments and NGOs must be able 
to handle the costs and administrative requirements 
or adapt them to local circumstances. These two 
questions are particularly relevant for African 
countries establishing CCT programs; in Kenya, for 
example, an evaluation comparing the impacts of 
conditional and unconditional transfer programs is 
under way. Third, if poor people’s preferences differ 
sufficiently from the conditions placed on their 
behavior by the government, the restrictions that 
conditionality imposes may actually reduce total 
welfare gains. Another way to look at this is to 
consider that conditional transfers can be perceived 
as demeaning, implying that the poor don’t know 
what is good for them and need to be told by the 
government. Fourth, poverty, culture, social 
exclusion, discrimination, and other historical 
processes may prevent people from participating in 
activities regardless of the benefits, such that the 
people in most need can actually be punished rather 
than helped by conditionality.  
Balancing these arguments and comparing the 
benefits of programs against the costs associated 
with conditionality is important but difficult; sparse 
evidence to date makes rigorous comparisons even 
harder. In the case of Progresa, monitoring 
conditionality represented approximately 2 percent of 
total program costs. Monitoring attendance had no 
effect on primary school enrollment but appears to 
have had a major impact in increasing the likelihood 
that students continue school after completing their 
primary education, with conditionality increasing en-
rollment in the first grade of lower secondary school 
by approximately 20 percentage points.  
Are CCT Programs Sufficient as a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy? 
CCT programs as currently designed are important 
parts of a poverty reduction strategy that aims to 
improve the health, nutrition, and education of 
young children in the short term and their income-
earning potential in the future, ultimately reducing 
the likelihood they will remain poor as adults. Other 
complementary strategies are needed, however, for 
people at other stages of the life cycle. Mexico’s 
Oportunidades is partially addressing this by offering 
(1) benefits throughout high school; (2) a cash 
incentive for high-school graduation conditional on 
its investment in higher education, a productive ac-
tivity, health insurance, housing, or continued 
savings; and (3) a cash transfer for beneficiaries 70 4 
years of age or older. Of course, poverty reduction 
also requires other approaches to promote economic 
development and job creation.  
Would All Developing Countries Benefit  
from a CCT Program? 
With a proven track record, CCT programs are a 
powerful approach not only to reducing poverty, but 
also to improving various educational, health-related, 
nutritional, and other welfare-related outcomes. That 
said, not all CCT programs have functioned as well 
as their designers had hoped. CCT programs are not 
for every country, and no two countries should 
necessarily adopt identical programs. In assessing 
whether a CCT program is appropriate, four main 
issues come to the fore: 
1.  What are current levels of specific human capital 
outcomes? If enrollment rates of primary school 
children are nearly 100 percent, it makes little 
sense to condition transfers on primary school 
enrollment. If, however, enrollment rates were 
only 70 percent, greater scope would exist for a 
CCT program—although the extent of this scope 
would only be revealed through further 
disaggregation of enrollment rates. For example, 
are the rates uniform across rural regions or for 
boys and girls? If pronounced regional, gender, 
or ethnic differences are present, a CCT program 
targeted to those lagging groups would be more 
effective than a countrywide program. 
2.  Why are specific human capital outcomes too 
low? Do they reflect an income constraint, such 
as parents needing the income that children 
bring in when not in school? Or are schools non-
existent, too far away, or considered unsafe for 
children to travel to or attend? Whether low 
school enrollment rates or poor nutrition out-
comes reflect constraints at the household level 
or the absence of adequate service provision 
needs to be determined prior to initiating a 
program. CCT programs are ideal where the 
supply of supporting services is good but under-
utilized; they are much less effective when sup-
porting services are limited. In such cases, 
improvements to the supply of schools, clinics, 
and so on should precede or accompany the 
launch of a program.  In some countries CCT 
programs have provided a strong impetus for 
improving services.  
3.  Is there high-level political support for a CCT 
program? By design, CCT programs require co-
ordination across different sectors, most notably 
social welfare, education, and health. This im-
plies that interministerial coordination will be 
necessary, which is difficult to achieve. An influ-
ential political champion of the program is 
needed to ensure that this coordination occurs. 
In Mexico, for example, strong support from 
inside the Ministry of Finance was an important 
factor in Progresa’s success.   
4.  What administrative resources are available? Is 
the necessary intersectoral coordination feasible, 
particularly when both transfers and supply-side 
interventions are envisaged? The level of com-
plexity of program design should reflect admin-
istrative capacity.  
CCT programs—while not a magic bullet—are 
worth serious consideration as part of an integrated 
poverty alleviation strategy. 
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